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OPINION

PER CURIAM
John A. Hill appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons given below, we will

affirm.
Hill was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northen District of
Ohio of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and marijuana (21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1)) and unlawful possession of ammunition (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). After the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d 305 (6th Cir.
1998), he filed a motion for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied.
Hill v. United States, 109 F.Supp.2d 741 (N.D. Ohio 2000). Hill does not appear to have
appealed the denial of that motion. He then filed a Rule 60(b) motion, which the court
construed as an unauthorized second § 2255 motion and transferred to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals to be treated as an application for such authorization. The application
was denied.
From his prison at USP Lewisburg, Hill subsequently filed a habeas corpus
petition pursuant to § 2241, arguing that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective because “its
limitations of procedure does [sic] not afford review of a claim based upon an
unconstitutional statute, the now excised Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) . . . and . . . the new
interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.” Without mentioning the cases by name, he argues that
in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), his indictment and conviction
are invalid because the indictment did not specify, and the jury did not find, drug type and
quantity, and that following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him.
The District Court dismissed the petition. The court explained that such claims
should ordinarily be brought via § 2255 and that they do not meet the standard for

resorting to § 2241 as set forth by this Court in Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117
(3d Cir. 2002), and In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997). The court noted that
even if this were not the case, Hill’s claims would fail on the merits because Apprendi
does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review such as Hill’s. See United
States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2003). This appeal followed.1
We fully agree with the District Court’s explanation of why § 2255 is not
“inadequate and ineffective” with respect to Hill’s claims. It follows, as the District
Court concluded, that § 2241 is not the proper means of raising those claims and, thus,
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to address them. See Application of Galante,
437 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1971). Because the Hill’s appeal does not present a substantial
issue, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.

1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary. Okereke v.
United States, 307 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2002).

